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Abstract: A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of ﬁelds
such as philosophy, logic, artiﬁcial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science,
etc.: various logics (epistemic logics; non-monotonic logics), probabilistic systems (most notably,
but not exclusively, Bayesian probability theory), belief revision systems, neural networks, among
others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be (minimally)
empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are
formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way to do so is to isolate a
number of key principles of the system, and design experiments to gauge the extent to which parti-
cipants do or do not follow them in reasoning tasks. Another way is to take relevant existing
results and check whether a particular formal model predicts these results. The present investiga-
tion provides an illustration of the second kind of empirical testing by comparing two formal mod-
els for reasoning – namely the non-monotonic logic known as preferential logic; and a particular
version of belief revision theories, screened belief revision – against the reasoning phenomenon
known as belief bias in the psychology of reasoning literature: human reasoners typically seek to
maintain the beliefs they already hold, and conversely to reject contradicting incoming informa-
tion. The conclusion of our analysis will be that screened belief revision is more empirically ade-
quate with respect to belief bias than preferential logic and non-monotonic logics in general, as
what participants seem to be doing is above all a form of belief management on the basis of back-
ground knowledge. The upshot is thus that, while it may offer valuable insights into the nature of
human reasoning, preferential logic (and non-monotonic logics in general) is ultimately inadequate
as a formal model of the phenomena in question.
Keywords: preferential logics, belief bias, belief revision, formal models of reasoning
1. Introduction
A RANGE OF FORMAL MODELS of human reasoning have been proposed in a number
of ﬁelds such as philosophy, logic, artiﬁcial intelligence, computer science, psy-
chology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics (epistemic logics; non-monotonic
logics), probabilistic systems (most notably, but not exclusively, Bayesian proba-
bility theory), belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Insofar as
they are models, each of these systems will inevitably display different levels of
idealization and simpliﬁcation with respect to the “messy” phenomena they
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represent. Moreover, some of these models are presented as having a normative
rather than descriptive character, which in turn may be seen as implying that a
signiﬁcant mismatch between actual patterns in human reasoning and the models
in question is not an issue.1 Here we focus on models that present themselves as
at least partially descriptive (though they may also be seen as having normative
import).
However, even if highly idealized, it seems reasonable to require that formal
models of human reasoning be (minimally) empirically adequate if they are to be
viewed as models of the phenomena in question. In other words, testing these
models empirically, as it were, seems like a perfectly reasonable methodological
desideratum. Naturally, the issue of the empirical adequacy of scientiﬁc models/
theories is a very general question within the philosophy of science, which has
been and continues to be extensively discussed (a seminal text in these debates is
Van Fraassen, 1980). Indeed, the empirical adequacy of formal models of human
reasoning is simply a speciﬁc instantiation of a much more general scientiﬁc
question. And yet, while many of the theorists involved in formal modelling of
human reasoning are well aware of the signiﬁcance of at least some level of
empirical adequacy for their models (in particular in cognitive science, where
empirically-grounded formal modelling is an important trend), this is arguably
not yet sufﬁciently recognized by a number of modellers in different ﬁelds.
How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test?
There is nothing particularly exotic about it when compared to how scientiﬁc the-
ories in general are empirically tested. One way to do so is to isolate a number of
key principles of the system, and design experiments to gauge the extent to which
participants do or do not follow these principles in reasoning tasks. Another way
is to take relevant existing results from empirical studies of human cognition
(e.g., in psychology and cognitive science), preferably robust results having
emerged from a large number of studies, and evaluate whether a particular formal
model predicts these results. If this is the case, then the model can be said to pass
this particular empirical test (which of course does not mean that the model is
once and for all empirically conﬁrmed). If, however, the model makes predictions
that clash with the robust empirical data in question, then it seems that the model
must be viewed as having limited empirical adequacy. This does not mean that
the model thereby becomes “useless”, as it may still be a valuable tool to investi-
gate different aspects of the phenomenon in question (with respect to which it is
empirically adequate), but it does mean that its level of empirical adequacy is
lower than might have been thought at ﬁrst.
1 It can be argued, however, that even normative models should be to some extent accountable towards
the empirical phenomena in question, but we will leave this issue aside for now.
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This kind of empirical testing can also be used to compare two different formal
models and determine which one is better supported by the data in question; natu-
rally, ceteris paribus, the model with a higher degree of empirical adequacy is to
be preferred. Furthermore, a comparison of the formal properties of the two sys-
tems which give rise to the different predictions may also tell us something about
the phenomenon which we may not have noticed before.
The present investigation provides an illustration of this second kind of empiri-
cal testing by comparing two formal models for reasoning – namely the non-
monotonic logic known as preferential logic and a particular version of belief
revision theories, screened belief revision – against the reasoning phenomenon
known as belief bias in the psychology of reasoning literature. Belief bias is the
tendency that reasoners display to let the (un)believability of the conclusion inﬂu-
ence their judgement of the (in)validity of an argument. It has been described as
“perhaps the best known and most widely accepted notion of inferential error to
come out of the literature on human reasoning” (Evans, 1989, p. 41), and is
related to a number of other empirically observed cognitive phenomena which all
point in the same direction: human reasoners typically seek to maintain the
beliefs they already hold, and conversely to reject contradicting incoming infor-
mation, thus typically letting background knowledge play an important role in
reasoning processes. This can be described as a tendency towards doxastic con-
servativeness. The conclusion of our analysis will be that screened belief revision
is more empirically adequate with respect to belief bias and doxastic conserva-
tiveness than preferential logic and non-monotonic logics in general.
Prima facie, non-monotonic logics – and preferential logic in particular, given
the key notion of preferred models – seem like a promising formal explanans for
the concept of doxastic conservativeness, and for the general idea of bringing
background knowledge (prior beliefs) to bear in reasoning tasks. Non-monotonic
logics have ﬁgured prominently in the recent work of Stenning and van Lambal-
gen (2008; 2010). They adopt their preferred non-monotonic framework, namely
closed-world reasoning, as a theoretical basis both to re-interpret previous results
in a number of well-known reasoning experiments – Wason selection task, sup-
pression task, etc. – and for the formulation and interpretation of new experi-
ments. Despite the comprehensiveness of their investigations, Stenning and van
Lambalgen did not discuss belief bias and related phenomena.
Besides the work of Stenning and van Lambalgen, a number of studies (such
as Benferhat et al., 2005; Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005) have taken as their starting
point some of the basic principles of well-known non-monotonic systems, and
formulated experiments to test the extent to which participants do reason accord-
ing to these principles (thus exemplifying the ﬁrst approach to empirical testing
described above). The results have for the most part indicated similarities between
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the reasoning behaviour of participants at experiments and these basic principles.
However, there have only been a handful of such studies, and so the question of
the empirical plausibility and adequacy of non-monotonic logics as accurate
descriptions of human reasoning requires further scrutiny at this point.
Empirical adequacy of the preferential framework against the belief bias
results, if obtained, would lend further support to the claim that non-monotonic
logics may represent a plausible descriptive model of human reasoning
(as defended by Stenning and van Lambalgen). In effect, many instances in which
participants seem to be performing deductive reasoning incorrectly can also be
explained as instances of participants in fact correctly performing defeasible rea-
soning instead. However, the comparison with the data will also highlight the lim-
itations of this framework. Indeed, a large chunk of the experimental results to be
discussed cannot be straightforwardly explained from the point of view of prefer-
ential logic (or other supraclassical non-monotonic logics for that matter), thus
establishing the limitations of this framework as a descriptive model of human
reasoning.
The alternative framework of belief revision theory (in one of its variants,
namely screened belief revision), which is known to be closely related to non-
monotonic logics (Makinson and Gärdenfors, 1991), seems to allow for a better ﬁt
with the belief bias experimental data as a whole, including the data that cannot be
accounted for within the preferential framework, thus outlining what may be “miss-
ing” in the latter.2 In other words, the predictions of screened belief revision are
essentially borne out by these empirical results, which thus means that screened
belief revision is more empirically adequate than preferential logic with respect to
these data. What this also suggests is that, in the case of the belief bias experiments
at least, what participants are in fact performing is neither indefeasible deductive
reasoning nor defeasible reasoning; instead, they are engaging in what could be
described as belief management – at each incoming piece of information, deter-
mining whether it should be incorporated to one’s belief set or not on the basis of
background knowledge and the reliability of the new information.3
The article proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst present the experimental data on
belief bias and related phenomena, which will later be used to test the empirical
2 The classical AGM belief revision framework is formally equivalent to preferential logic (the KLM
system), and this is why we need to turn to a different variant of belief revision theory in order to
account for the data that preferential logic cannot account for. What is peculiar about screened belief
revision is precisely that background knowledge and prior beliefs play a more central role than in AGM.
3 The observation that there may be a discrepancy between what experimenters aim at and how partici-
pants in fact interpret the task at hand has been made before by Oaksford and Chater (1991) and
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008; 2010); the latter emphasize the importance of the process of reason-
ing to an interpretation of the task materials, not only from an interpretation.
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adequacy of preferential logic and screened belief revision. In the second part we
introduce preferential logic and apply the framework speciﬁcally to the experi-
mental results discussed in the ﬁrst section. The outcome is that, while this logic
predicts some of these results, it fails to predict a signiﬁcant subgroup of them. In
the third part, we discuss a speciﬁc version of belief-revision theory (screened
belief revision), and show that its predictions are very much aligned with the
belief bias data. We then offer some philosophical observations in the fourth part.
The overall conclusion is thus that the formal treatment of the notion of most pre-
ferred models in preferential logic ultimately fails as a formal explanans for the
phenomenon of doxastic conservativeness (as exempliﬁed by the belief bias
results) in human reasoning, whereas screened belief revision seems to fare better
in this respect.
2. Experimental data
As is well known, one of the key concepts to have emerged from the psychologi-
cal literature on reasoning and decision-making is the concept of cognitive biases.
It ﬁgures prominently in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) “heuristics and biases”
research programme, as well as in the literature on reasoning stemming from the
pioneer work of P. Wason in the 1960s. With respect to reasoning in particular,
biases were initially conceptualized as systematic deviations from the canons dic-
tated by classical logic (or some other “traditional” normative system). However,
as the status of classical logic as the only legitimate normative system for human
reasoning began to be questioned (Oaksford and Chater, 1991), the association
between the concept of biases and the notion of reasoning “mistakes” began to be
questioned as well (although the strong normative conception is still widespread).
As described by Klayman (1995), a bias can be understood in (at least)
three ways:
• A tendency or inclination (neutral)
• A ﬂawed reasoning tendency (negative)
• Bounded rationality: people may deviate systematically from theoretical stan-
dards, but may still be behaving optimally when broader concerns and limita-
tions are taken into account.
For the present investigation, the main point is that what counts as a faulty
response from the point of view of deductive, monotonic reasoning, purportedly
betraying the effect of reasoning biases, may just as well count as an adequate
response from the point of view of different normative standards. (This general
point has been made before, in particular by Oaksford and Chater with respect to
Bayesian normative standards.) However, adopting different normative standards
© 2016 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria
33REASONING BIASES, NON-MONOTONIC LOGICS AND BELIEF REVISION
– and accordingly, different formal frameworks to guide the investigation – does
not mean that the very notion of reasoning errors will fade away: reasoners may
still make reasoning mistakes even if what they are trying to do is to perform,
say, defeasible reasoning.
In the psychological literature, a number of phenomena have been identiﬁed
which all seem to point in the same direction: a tendency to reason towards main-
taining the beliefs we already hold, which can be described as a tendency towards
doxastic conservativeness. This general tendency manifests itself in several ways,
and one general term that is often used to refer to a number of related phenomena
is “conﬁrmation bias” (Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998).
In a similar vein, Kahneman (2011) coined the acronym “WYSIATI” to refer
to the principle “what you see is all there is”, which manifests itself in the form
of several of the “biases” he discusses throughout the book. Here the idea is the
privileged status accorded to positive available information – prior beliefs, back-
ground knowledge – when reasoning, leading to a tendency of “jumping to con-
clusions on the basis of limited evidence” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 86). In effect,
this is a rather accurate description of what non-monotonic reasoning is about:
“jumping to conclusions” on the basis of partial information, which is of course
all we have to go by on numerous occasions. Indeed, even those (such as
Kahneman) who see it as giving rise to biases recognize that this tendency is by
and large (though not always) a reliable guide for action.
WYSIATI facilitates the achievement of coherence and of the cognitive ease that causes us to
accept a statement as true. It explains … how we are able to make sense of partial information in
a complex world. Much of the time, the coherent story we put together is close enough to reality
to support reasonable action. However, I will also invoke WYSIATI to help explain a long and
diverse list of biases of judgment and choice … (Kahneman, 2011, p. 87)
In the reasoning literature more speciﬁcally, one (extensively investigated) ten-
dency that participants in experiments seem to have is to endorse arguments whose
conclusions they believe, and likewise to reject arguments whose conclusions they
disbelieve, irrespective of their actual validity; this is again a manifestation of a
general inclination towards doxastic conservativeness in human reasoners. The
term commonly used to refer to this tendency is “belief bias”. Stanovich (2003,
p. 292) also speaks of a “fundamental computational bias”: “the tendency to auto-
matically bring prior knowledge to bear when solving problems”. Stanovich’s
fundamental computational bias as such does not entail doxastic conservativeness
– i.e., it is not sufﬁcient for doxastic conservativeness – but it is clearly connected
to the inclination to maintain one’s previous beliefs. So all in all, it seems that,
when reasoning, we spontaneously bring in prior beliefs and background knowl-
edge, and then reason towards a story that maximizes accommodation of these
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prior beliefs to the data of the problem (and vice versa). Coherence is usually
achieved by maintaining entrenched prior beliefs as much as possible.4
So let us look at some of the experimental data supporting these claims. In
Evans et al. (1983),5 participants were presented with fully formulated syllo-
gistic arguments (embedded in longer texts, so as to reduce artiﬁciality) and
then asked to evaluate whether a given conclusion could be “logically
deduced” (or if it “necessarily follows”) from the information contained in
the text. The syllogistic arguments presented were of four types: valid argu-
ments (valid according to traditional syllogistic, that is) with believable con-
clusions; valid arguments with unbelievable conclusions; invalid arguments
with believable conclusions; invalid arguments with unbelievable conclu-
sions.6 Table 1 displays some examples of the arguments used in the study.
(Notice that the two valid arguments have the same “logical form”, and the
same holds for the two invalid ones.) Table 2 shows the percentages of argu-
ments whose conclusions were said to “follow necessarily” from the premises
by the participants.
It is immediately apparent that there are some interesting correlations between
the participants’ responses and the (un)believability of the conclusions: arguments
with believable conclusions were much more often endorsed than those with
4 Naturally, this is a view also familiar from the philosophical literature, most notably defended by
Quine, for example in Quine (1955).
5 One may quibble with the fact that this study is already 30 years old. However, the belief bias effect
has been replicated several times in a large number of studies since, and the general pattern described in
this study has been conﬁrmed time and again.
6 Typically, belief bias experiments include a preliminary, independent step of believability evaluation
of the conclusions taken in isolation.
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unbelievable conclusions, both for valid and for invalid arguments. Validity also
had an effect, as valid arguments were more often endorsed than invalid ones in
each of the categories (believable vs. unbelievable conclusions). But what is per-
haps most striking is that invalid arguments with believable conclusions were
more often endorsed (71%) than valid arguments with unbelievable conclusions
(56%). Clearly, external prior beliefs and background knowledge were brought in
when participants were evaluating these arguments, even though the instructions
referred speciﬁcally to the concept of conclusions being “logically deduced”,
which pertains exclusively to the relation between premises and conclusions, not
to their truth or believability.7 In effect, arguments whose conclusions conﬁrm the
reasoner’s prior beliefs were deemed correct much more often than those whose
conclusions went against the reasoner’s prior beliefs.
To further probe the effect of conclusion believability, Stanovich and collabora-
tors (Sá et al., 1999) designed an experiment including arguments whose conclu-
sions would be neither believable nor unbelievable, given that they were
composed of invented words. They started by giving participants an invalid syllo-
gistic argument (again, invalid according to traditional syllogistic) with a believa-
ble conclusion:
All living things need water.
Roses need water.
Therefore, roses are living things.
As could have been anticipated, only 32% of the participants identiﬁed this argu-
ment as invalid. Subsequently, the same group of participants was given a little
7 If an argument is valid and has true premises, then it is described as a sound argument; sound argu-
ments are thus a subclass of valid arguments, as the truth of premises is not required for validity. It is of
course questionable whether untrained participants would possess the appropriate concept of “logical
deduction” or “validity” so as to understand what exactly was expected of them in the task. This is an
important methodological objection to these studies, but it does not invalidate the observation that parti-
cipants endorse arguments with believable conclusions much more readily than those with unbelievable
conclusions. Indeed, it underscores the fact that the initial stage where a participant preprocesses the
input requires further scrutiny, as also pointed out by Stenning and van Lambalgen.
Table 2. Percentages of arguments whose conclusion were said to “follow
necessarily”
Believable conclusion Unbelievable conclusion
Valid 89 56
Invalid 71 10
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scenario about another planet with different animals, and the following syllogistic
argument of the same “logical form” as the previous one (and thus invalid):
All animals of the hudon class are ferocious.
Wampets are ferocious.
Therefore, wampets are animals of the hudon class.
This time, 78% of the very same participants deemed this argument to be inva-
lid, as believability of conclusion was not a factor this time around. (Presumably,
participants have no prior beliefs concerning made-up words such as “wampets”
and “hudon”.) Stanovich (2003) presents these results as offering strong support
to his ascription of a “fundamental computational bias” to human reasoners.
Moreover, notice that the instructions in both cases were identical, so the general
worry that participants do not understand exactly what it means for a conclusion
to follow logically from the premises seems somewhat attenuated by the observa-
tion that in this case, the vast majority apparently “knew what to do” (from the
point of view of what the experimenter expected them to do).
One may object that requiring participants to evaluate fully formulated argu-
ments does not really capture their reasoning behaviour in real-life situations. In
particular, we should mainly be interested in how they draw conclusions them-
selves, rather than in how they evaluate previously drawn conclusions. In effect,
experiments with conclusion-production tasks have also been conducted, and
again the belief bias pattern emerges quite robustly. For example, in Oakhill and
Johnson-Laird (1985), participants were given pairs of syllogistic premises and
asked to choose one option from a list of ﬁve options, which included conclu-
sions following necessarily from the premises, other sentences with the same
terms, as well as the option “no valid conclusion” (among those listed).8 One of
the pairs presented to participants was:
Some of the actresses are not beautiful.
All of the women are beautiful.
According to syllogistic, this pair of premises produces a necessary conclusion,
as it is an instance of the valid syllogistic mood “Some A are not B. All C are B.
Therefore, some A are not C”. Thus, the correct response from the point of view
of classical deductive logic/syllogistic is “Some of the actresses are not women”.
This is, however, a highly unbelievable conclusion (in fact the authors describe it
as “deﬁnitionally false”), clashing violently with the reasoner’s background
8 It may still be objected that this is yet not a case of conclusion production, properly speaking, but
given the requirement of a controlled experimental setting, this is probably the best that can be
hoped for.
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knowledge. And indeed, participants’ responses indicate yet again unwillingness
to revise their prior beliefs concerning actresses not being women: only 38% of
the participants chose the syllogistically correct response, “Some of the actresses
are not women” as the conclusion; 46% of them said there was no valid conclu-
sion to be drawn (16% gave other responses). This result illustrates the pattern of
refusing to draw a conclusion that does not accord with prior belief, even if the
reasoner is instructed to focus on the notion of logical validity.
Participants were also given pairs of premises from which no conclusion can
be drawn according to classical syllogistic (i.e., a sentence where a term from
each of the premises is connected to the other term in a categorical sentence of
the form “All A is B”, “Some A is B”, “No A is B” or “Some A is not B”, and
which follows necessarily from the premises). One example is:
Some of the women are not beautiful.
All of the beautiful people are actresses.
The premises instantiate the forms “Some A are not B” and “All B are C” from
which no syllogistic conclusion can be drawn. This time, only 17% of participants
opted for the syllogistically correct “No valid conclusion” response (i.e., none of
the alternatives provided follows necessarily from the premises). Forty-six per cent
opted for “Some of the women are not actresses” as a conclusion following from
the premises, presumably because this is a statement with a high degree of believa-
bility involving the terms in the premises. (There was a residue 37% of other
responses.) This result illustrates the pattern of “jumping to a conclusion” that is
not a deductive conclusion from the premises but is highly believable.
So there are two patterns of deviation from the “correct responses” from the
point of view of traditional deductive logic (based on the concept of necessary
truth-preservation):
Undergeneration: There is a conclusion that does follow necessarily from the given
premises, but which reasoners refuse to draw if it clashes with their prior beliefs.
Overgeneration: There is a “conclusion” that does not follow necessarily from the
given premises, but which reasoners readily draw if it also has a high degree
of believability.
The experimental data suggest that overgeneration occurs more frequently
than undergeneration. In the ﬁrst study cited here, for example, in 71% of
the cases participants gave the “wrong” reply when the argument was invalid
with a believable conclusion. By contrast, in only 44% of the cases did par-
ticipants incorrectly deem a deductively valid argument with unbelievable
conclusion to be invalid. As we will see, preferential logic can successfully
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account for the more robust phenomenon of overgeneration, but they fail to
account for the less robust but nevertheless clearly pervasive phenomenon of
undergeneration.
3. Preferential logic
Preferential logic was ﬁrst introduced in Shoham (1987), where a semantic
framework for nonmonotonic logics was proposed with the goal of providing a
uniﬁed analysis for the several non-monotonic logics then available in the litera-
ture. The key idea is the concept of most preferred models,9 which allows for
the deﬁnition of a preferential consequence relation: A is a preferential conse-
quence of Γ iff A is true in all of the most preferred models of Γ. This deﬁni-
tion contrasts with the classical deﬁnition of logical consequence, which requires
A to be true in absolutely all models of Γ, not only the most preferred ones.
The framework can accommodate different preference criteria, thus generating
different non-monotonic logics by associating a “standard” monotonic logic with
different preference relations over models. (There are restrictions on what counts
as a legitimate preference relation for this purpose.)
Here is the general idea. Take a monotonic logic L; since L is monotonic, the fol-
lowing property holds: for all A, B and C in L, if A ) C, then also A, B ) C. Then
deﬁne a strict partial order10 ≺ on the class of models M of L: M1 ≺ M2 means that
M1 is preferred over M2. L≺ is the non-monotonic logic generated from L and ≺.
Deﬁnition. Let M be a model and Γ a ﬁnite set of formulae. Then M preferen-
tially satisﬁes Γ (M |=≺ Γ) iff M is a model of Γ (M |= Γ), and there is no
other model M0 such that M0 ≺ M and M0 |= Γ. M is a most preferred
(or minimal) model of Γ.11
Deﬁnition. A is a preferential consequence of Γ (Γ )≺ A) iff for any M, if
M |=≺ Γ, then M |= A. That is, the class of models of A (preferred or
otherwise) is a superset of the class of preferred models of Γ.
It is easy to see that )≺ is a non-monotonic consequence relation. If an arbi-
trary C is added to the antecedent, now the consequence obtains only if B holds
in all most preferred models of A and C together. But it may well be that {A, C}
9 A model of a set of sentences is an interpretation in which all sentences in the set are true.
10 A strict partial order is a binary relation that is irreﬂexive, transitive and asymmetric. Non-strict par-
tial orders (reﬂexive, transitive and anti-symmetric) or, more generally, pre-orders (reﬂexive and transi-
tive) are also used to generate different non-monotonic logics.
11 The qualiﬁcation “most” can be dropped for convenience of expression.
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has preferred models that are not preferred models of A alone; in fact, the two
classes of preferred models may even be disjoint.12 And it may well happen that
in at least one preferred model of {A, C} that is not a preferred model of A alone,
B does not hold: so the consequence relation no longer holds with the addition of
C to the antecedent.
One of the advantages of the preferential framework is that it allows for an illumi-
nating characterization of the divide between defeasible and indefeasible reasoning.
Indefeasible reasoning would be a limit case of defeasible reasoning, namely the
case where all models are preferred models – in other words, where the preferential
order has all models as minimal and is thus no longer an order, so to speak. The idea
is that for indefeasible reasoning, each and every model is equally “normal”. Indeed,
the difference between monotonic reasoning and (non-monotonic) preferential rea-
soning is that the former requires that the reasoner takes into account each and every
model of the premises, whereas the latter restricts the requirement to a subclass of
the models of the premises, namely the most preferred ones.
When he proposed the framework of preferential logic, Shoham had the explicit
concern of capturing an actual feature of the cognitive makeup of human reasoners.
As described in the classic Kraus et al. (1990) (usually referred to as KLM):
He [Shoham] suggested models that may be described as a set of worlds equipped with a preference
relation: the preference relation is a partial order and a world v is preferable, in the eyes of the rea-
soner, to some other world w if he considers v to be more normal than w. One would then, in the
model, on the basis of a proposition α, conclude, defeasibly, that a proposition β is true if all worlds
that satisfy α and are most normal among worlds satisfying α also satisfy β. (KLM, 169).
What corresponds to the “most preferred models” of a human reasoner? Argua-
bly, they correspond to the representations that most accord with her prior beliefs
and background knowledge about the world at a given time t, i.e., on the basis of
the information available to her at t. As new information comes in, the agent may
be led to revise or update her beliefs about the world; indeed, the preferential
framework is inherently dynamic, and thus lends itself well to the representation
of the development of an agent’s cognitive states through time in function of the
ﬂow of information (van Benthem and Liu, 2004).
However, even though there is an avowed initial epistemic motivation at the
heart of preferential logic, ultimately this is a framework developed within the
artiﬁcial intelligence community, where goals of computational tractability and
implementation remain central (alongside other desiderata and considerations).
As such, the formal apparatus is accountable towards two potentially conﬂicting
12 The standard example goes: if A is “Tweety is a bird”, the preferred models of this premise also
validate the conclusion “Tweety can ﬂy”, but if C is “Tweety is an ostrich”, then the class of preferred
models of A and the class of preferred models of {A, C} are disjoint.
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sets of desiderata: epistemic plausibility vs. tractability (technical simplicity).
One idealization related to tractability is the Limit Assumption, which guarantees
that we are not dealing with a non-terminating chain of preferred models. This
assumption ensures that a preferential logic enjoys the property of Cautious
Monotony (if a set of premises imply A and the same set of premises imply B,
then this set of premises plus A will also imply B), which is widely seen as a
desirable metalogical property (Koons, 2013, sections 4.2 and 5.2). Now, this
seems to be a desideratum mostly related to the tractability of the formal frame-
work and its status as a logic, not to its epistemic plausibility.
We now explore how the framework can be applied to account for the empiri-
cal data on human reasoning presented above; we will see that some of its fea-
tures do seem to limit the applicability of the preferential framework to the
empirical data in signiﬁcant ways.
As noted above, there are two patterns of discrepancy in participants’ responses
with respect to the deductive canons, both connected to the (un)believability of the
conclusion: overgeneration – they draw inferences to “conclusions” that do not
follow deductively from the premises but which are highly believable; and under-
generation – they refuse to draw inferences to conclusions that do follow deduc-
tively from the premises but which are highly unbelievable. Preferential logic fares
well with the overgeneration phenomenon, but fails to explain the undergeneration
phenomenon. This follows immediately from the observation that preferential
logic is supraclassical (with respect to the original classical, monotonic logic L):
for every A and B, if A ) B, then A )≺ B, given that the preferred models of
A are also models of A tout court. So obviously, there are consequences that are
preferentially but not classically valid, but not vice versa.
Before we move on to the empirical data, it may be worth pointing out again
that the present analysis is above all concerned with the descriptive level of how
human agents in fact reason, leaving aside the (thorny) normative question of how
humans ought to reason.13 The question is thorny because the tendency towards
doxastic conservativeness and the “jumping to conclusions” phenomenon – in
short, taking into account background knowledge when reasoning – are for the
most part advantageous for human reasoners, but on certain occasions they also
seem to lead to suboptimal results. But for reasons of space, we cannot discuss
the normative issue any further here.
13 Harman (1986) has offered compelling arguments on why classical deductive logic is not a suitable
normative system for human reasoning, but this does not necessarily mean that any of the non-classical
alternatives available (either supraor subclassical) fares substantially better as a normative (as opposed to
descriptive) model for reasoning.
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Turning to the experimental results now, let us start with the easier case, over-
generation. Recall the following argument:
ψ : Some of the women are not beautiful.
ϕ: All of the beautiful people are actresses.
χ: Thus, some of the women are not actresses.
Following the semantic deﬁnition of preferential consequence, the question is:
does χ hold in the preferred models of {ψ , ϕ}? We know that it is not true in all
models of {ψ , ϕ}, and this is why χ is not a deductive consequence of ψ and ϕ.
But among the models of {ψ , ϕ}, which ones are considered “more normal” by
the agent: the ones where χ holds or the ones where χ does not hold? Clearly the
former are considered “more normal”, even if {ψ , ϕ} is compatible both with χ
and with not-χ. And so, in all preferred models of {ψ , ϕ}, χ is also true, and thus
{ψ , ϕ} )≺ χ. Interestingly, this account resembles closely the “one-model”
account of belief bias presented in Klauer et al. (2000), which is quite robustly
supported by the data. So at this point preferential logic seems to fare well at the
test of empirical adequacy posed by the belief bias data.
A similar argument holds for the other case of overgeneration discussed above:
All living things need water.
Roses need water.
Thus, roses are living things.
This argument also satisﬁes the deﬁnition of preferential consequence if is
granted that in the agent’s most preferred models of the premises, “Roses are
living things” is satisﬁed.
By contrast, the preferential approach does not have much to say if the agent
does not have any background knowledge or prior beliefs about the content of
premises or conclusion, as in the hudon/wampets case mentioned above: in her
preferred models, the conclusion is indeterminate. So she cannot resort to prefer-
ential reasoning to judge the validity of this argument. Presumably, this means
that some other reasoning strategy must be called upon, which explains the dis-
crepancy in results between the roses case and the wampets case (despite the sim-
ilarity between the two cases from the point of view of classical/traditional logic).
Let us now turn to undergeneration. To account for the phenomenon of underge-
neration in the same manner, what would be required is a logic that does not
license some of the inferences licensed by classical logic – in other words, a sub-
classical logic. Because they are supraclassical, preferential logics are not able to
account for why participants refuse to draw a deductive conclusion when it is unbe-
lievable. However, the subclassical logics currently available, such as intuitionistic
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and relevant logics, are strictly subclassical and thus do not license any inferences
not licensed by classical logic. For this reason, they cannot handle overgeneration.
Moreover, what seems to be going on in the undergeneration cases discussed here
is not the kind of phenomenon that motivates these subclassical logics
(e.g., rejection of ex falso quodlibet or of excluded middle). So we will need to
look elsewhere. What could then explain the participants’ refusal to draw the con-
clusion “Some of the actresses are not women” in the example above?
We submit that this tendency is related to the process of revising (or not) the
agent’s belief set with the given premises. In particular, the premise “All of the
women are beautiful” is presumably not satisﬁed in the agent’s belief set (i.e., the
agent does not believe that all women are beautiful), which thus would require a
revision process. Now, one peculiar feature of deductive reasoning is that reason-
ers are expected to reason with premises regardless of their belief or knowledge
of them. This is, however, a somewhat artiﬁcial cognitive task for most
(untrained) reasoners (Dutilh Novaes, 2013), and the artiﬁciality component is
enhanced in an experimental setting. Indeed, there is compelling empirical evi-
dence to the effect that plausibility monitoring is a routine component of lan-
guage comprehension (Isberner and Kern-Isberner, 2016), which underscores the
“artiﬁciality” of deductive reasoning as classically construed.
If the agent did indeed perform the revision of her belief set with the informa-
tion “All of the women are beautiful” while retaining the belief that some
actresses are not beautiful, then in her revised belief set, the counterintuitive con-
clusion – “Some actresses are not women” – would hold. But this process would
require too much revision of the original belief set (including the very deﬁnition
of “actresses”), and this seems to be what many participants in fact do not exe-
cute, despite being told to do so by the experimental instructions. (The idea that
new information does not necessarily bring about a revision, e.g., if it is incon-
sistent with one’s background knowledge, is precisely the rationale for the notions
of semi-revision and screened revision introduced in the belief revision literature
(Makinson, 1997), which will be discussed in the next section.)
It might be objected that, since “Some actresses are not women” is deﬁnition-
ally false, the agent does well to reject the conclusion, simply because this is the
best way to avoid an inconsistent set of beliefs/commitments. But notice that
undergeneration occurs also in cases where the conclusion is not deﬁnitionally
false but simply highly unbelievable.14 Indeed, in the Evans et al. (1983) study
mentioned, deductively valid arguments with (merely factually) unbelievable con-
clusions such as “Therefore, some vitamin tablets are not nutritional” were also
14 Admittedly, in the Oakhill and Johnson-Laird (1985) study, the undergeneration effect was pro-
nounced especially in cases of conclusions that were deﬁnitionally false.
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deemed invalid in almost half of the cases. Moreover, a non-negligible 38% of
participants did choose “Some actresses are not women” as the correct answer,
thus apparently following the experiment’s instructions closely.
This observation conﬁrms yet again the general idea that humans have a
tendency towards doxastic conservativeness and thus resist engaging in such
revisions. This is the case specially when the revisions required are quite
substantive and would thus entail signiﬁcant modiﬁcations in their doxastic
states – certainly when there is no real motivation to undertake such a revi-
sion, as in the case of an “artiﬁcial” reasoning experiment. But in fact, the
tendency towards ignoring counterintuitive evidence, i.e., evidence which
would force a thorough revision of one’s prior beliefs, is also observed in
more “natural” situations of reasoning, as the literature on conﬁrmation bias
illustrates (Nickerson, 1998).
In sum, it seems that the phenomenon of overgeneration of “conclusions” can
be explained in terms of preferential reasoning, whereas the phenomenon of
undergeneration of conclusions requires that attention be paid to the stage of
revising one’s belief set with incoming information (the premises). In cases
where the incoming information is implausible (such as “all women are beauti-
ful”), the agent may fail to perform the revision (either consciously or not), and
this leads to the rejection of a counterintuitive conclusion which would however
hold in her revised state of beliefs, had the agent in fact revised her belief set
with the implausible premise. But as it stands, the preferential framework does
not seem to offer the resources to tackle the issue of preferred models not being
modiﬁed with the arrival of new information. (In fact, logic-based frameworks in
general do not problematize what happens at the stage of receiving the premises.)
4. Undergeneration and screened revision
In the previous section we have argued that undergeneration cannot be straight-
forwardly explained by preferential logic because it is supraclassical. However,
although it is indeed the case that no logical framework that satisﬁes supraclassi-
cality can explain undergeneration, the problem is in fact deeper. We conjectured
that in the case of undergeneration, the agent does not in fact incorporate the
offered premises. So, the only way to restrict the “prioritized” status of incoming
information is by giving up the reﬂexivity axiom, which says that A implies A,
for any A. However, giving up reﬂexivity comes at a high price. Reﬂexivity is
considered “a rather minimal requirement on a relation of logical consequence. It
is hard to imagine in what sense a relation that fails to satisfy reﬂexivity, can still
be considered a consequence relation” (Antonelli, 2012, section 1). Although
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there might well be plausible consequence relations that are not reﬂexive,15 all
well-known non-monotonic consequence relations satisfy reﬂexivity. For this rea-
son, in what follows we examine a different framework, namely the framework of
belief revision, to investigate how it might deal with the undergeneration cases.
As is well known, theories of belief revision take a collection of beliefs, repre-
sented by sentences, as the belief state of an agent. Subsequently, operators are
deﬁned to perform the addition and removal of other beliefs. The main operators
are revision and contraction. Since these operations might conﬂict with other
beliefs of the agents, it may be necessary to perform changes on other beliefs as
well. There are several frameworks that describe “how to revise a knowledge sys-
tem in the light of new information that is inconsistent with what is already in the
system” (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1988, p. 83). In the original belief revision
model (the AGM framework; Alchourrón et al., 1985), revision is performed
using an operation called partial meet revision. The important thing for our pur-
poses is that an operator is a partial meet revision operator if and only if it satis-
ﬁes the following six postulates:
Closure K * p = Cn(K * p)
Success p 2 K * p
Inclusion K * p  K + p
Vacuity If ¬ p =2 K, then K * p = K + p
Consistency K * p is consistent if p is consistent
Extensionality If (p $ q) 2 Cn(), then K * p = K * q
K is the agent’s belief set and is supposed to be closed under logical conse-
quence, p is the input sentence and Cn is a supraclassical consequence relation.
For our purposes, it is crucial to notice that there exists a translation between
these postulates and the KLM system (Makinson and Gärdenfors, 1991). So, in
the AGM framework, the belief revision operator can be considered to be func-
tionally equivalent to the preferential consequence relation.
As has become clear in the previous section, any straightforward, supraclassical
non-monotonic consequence relation will be at odds with the empirical data on
belief bias in virtue of the undergeneration side. Now, if the AGM postulates are
equivalent to the KLM system, then they will presumably not be able to account
for undergeneration either. In particular, there is a problem with the second postu-
late, Success, which states that the input sentence is always an element of the
resulting belief set (Makinson and Gärdenfors, 1991, p. 192). Importantly, the
15 In fact, the very ﬁrst logical system ever invented, Aristotle’s syllogistic, is irreﬂexive (Duncombe,
2014). But the consensus among logicians and philosophers still seems to be that reﬂexivity is a sine qua
non condition for something to count as a legitimate consequence relation.
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Success postulate has been considered empirically implausible in its own right,
which makes the rejection of this postulate non-adhoc. Success is implausible,
“because in many cases it is not reasonable to give priority to information just
because it is new” (Simari and Falappa, 2004, p. 1342). Theories of belief revi-
sion that reject Success are generally called “non-prioritized”.16
There are several ways to perform a non-prioritized revision operation. In this
article we focus on a family of revision theories where the input sentence is ﬁrst
evaluated, and a “regular” prioritized belief revision is performed if and only if
the sentence is considered acceptable (Hansson, 1999, pp. 413–414). A form of
non-prioritized belief revision that works in this way is Makinson’s screened revi-
sion (Makinson, 1997). This operation assumes a set A of core beliefs that are
immune to revision. An input sentence is added to the core belief set of the agent
if and only if it is consistent with A. If it is consistent, a revision operator can be
used to revise the belief set. Otherwise, the input sentence is rejected.
This is a natural way to let background knowledge play an important role in
determining whether a revision should be performed, but as Makinson recog-
nizes, this “simple” version of screened revision, with a set of beliefs that are
carved in stone, represents a rather dogmatic mentality. A somewhat more intui-
tive and ﬂexible notion of belief revision is what Makinson calls relationally
screened revision.17 The idea behind this kind of revision is that an input is only
accepted if it is consistent with the sentences from the original belief set that are
a priori more credible than the input sentence (Makinson, 1997, p. 18). The
notion of a priori credibility can be deﬁned in different ways, but one way to do
so is by using the notion of entrenchment (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1988). If
we denote a priori credibility (or entrenchment) with the < operator, then rela-
tionally screened revision can be deﬁned as follows:
Relationally screened revision (Makinson, 1997, p. 18)
K # <α = K * {β : α <β}α, if α is consistent with {β : α < β} \ K
= K otherwise
where K * {β : α <β} is a revision operator that protects {β : α < β}
16 An anonymous referee suggests that Success is not implausible if one preprocesses incoming infor-
mation. The idea is that the prioritized revision operation should only be applied to sentences that are
deemed believable in this ﬁrst stage. We think this is correct, but non-prioritized belief revision is pre-
cisely a way to incorporate this “preprocessing” stage into the system.
17 In the ﬁrst decade of this century, many alternative non-prioritized revision operators have been
developed (see, for example, Fermé and Hansson, 2011, pp. 310–311, for a classiﬁcation and Fermé
and Rott, 2004, for an example of an alternative belief revision model that operates on the basis of
epistemic entrenchment). Our focus on Makinson’s relatively simple model should not be taken to
imply that it is the only belief revision model that is empirically adequate with respect to the belief
bias data.
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This deﬁnition says that if the new information α is inconsistent with the
beliefs from K that are a priori more credible than α, then no change occurs in
K. If, on the other hand, this inconsistency is not present, it might still be the
case that α is inconsistent with the whole body of K. In this case an operation is
performed that protects the beliefs from K that are a priori more credible than
α. So in either case, the beliefs from K that are a priori more credible than α
remain present in the target belief set. Notice that the notion of entrenchment
thus deﬁned is very much in the spirit of the informal notion of doxastic con-
servativeness, which we claim is the overall phenomenon behind the belief-bias
results.
In the remainder of this section, we show that relationally screened revision
can explain both overgeneration and undergeneration. Hence, it is more empiri-
cally adequate with respect to the experimental data on belief bias than preferen-
tial logic.18 Recall that in the typical example of overgeneration, we have the
following argument:
ψ : Some of the women are not beautiful.
ϕ: All of the beautiful people are actresses.
χ: Some of the women are not actresses.
For most agents, ψ and χ are already part of their belief sets. Therefore, if the
agent is presented with ψ , no changes will occur. If the agent is presented with ϕ,
probably a new piece of information, it is necessary to determine whether ϕ is
consistent with the beliefs that are a priori more credible than ϕ ({β : ϕ < β} \
K). If ϕ is not consistent with {β : ϕ < β} \ K, then ϕ is rejected. Otherwise, a
revision is performed that protects all elements from {β : ϕ < β}. Since χ 2 K
and ϕ < χ, χ is also an element of the resulting belief set.
Concerning undergeneration, the case that was not predicted by preferential
logic, we are considering the following valid argument:
ψ : Some of the actresses are not beautiful.
ϕ: All of the women are beautiful.
χ: Some of the actresses are not women.
18 An anonymous referee suggests that it is possible to deﬁne a preferential consequence relation )≺
in terms of the relationally screened revision operator by using an adapted form of the Ramsey test:
A )≺ B iff A#<B. So it might seem that, if there is a relationally screened revision operator which satis-
ﬁes undergeneration, there must also be a preferential consequence relation that is as successful in the
undergeneration cases. However, as was pointed out in the beginning of this section, this relation would
not satisfy the reﬂexivity axiom, which for most people still is a non-negotiable feature for a conse-
quence relation.
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Since the agent probably has the more plausible “it is not the case that all of
the women are beautiful” in his belief set, the expectation is that ϕ will be rejected.
And if ϕ is not integrated into the agent’s belief set, then χ will not be a conse-
quence of the resulting (unmodiﬁed) belief set, and thus can be rejected by the
agent.
It is interesting to notice that, in this particular experiment, most participants
apparently went through the “screening” process leading to the non-
incorporation of the premise provided, despite being told (explicitly or implic-
itly) to reason with the premises regardless of their plausibility. (We leave
aside the issue of the extent to which this process is conscious or uncon-
scious.) However, a non-negligible 38% of the participants did draw the highly
counterintuitive conclusion, and thus presumably did perform the revision
required to accommodate ϕ (even if only temporarily, and for the sake of the
task at hand) into their belief sets. (More on individual variations in the next
section.)
5. Observations
Initially, the main argument in favour of the preferential approach was that the
key concept of “most preferred models” seems to correspond neatly to some
robust psychological phenomena identiﬁed experimentally, and which have been
described under different names: conﬁrmation bias, belief bias, Stanovich’s funda-
mental computational bias, Kahneman’s WYSIATI, etc. Even if these are not
exactly the same phenomena, they are all closely related, and all point in the
direction of what we have described as a strong component of doxastic conserv-
ativeness in human cognition. However, because it offers no tools to problema-
tize the very process of revising (or not!) an agent’s belief state with incoming
information, preferential logic offers at best a partial account of the phenomena.
This is then reﬂected in its inability to account for the undergeneration part
of the story: why some agents often refuse to draw conclusions that are
counterintuitive.
And yet, undergeneration and overgeneration both arguably arise from the
same tendency towards doxastic conservativeness, which leads human reasoners
to “jump to conclusions” when they are plausible, and to reject conclusions which
are implausible. This means that neither supraclassical nor subclassical logics can
fully match the empirical data in question: supraclassical logics such as preferen-
tial logic are at odds with the undergeneration phenomenon, while subclassical
logics are at odds with the overgeneration phenomenon. Above, we offered a brief
sketch of how screened revision is better equipped to deal with both phenomena
in a uniform way.
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In fact, an alternative account of the belief bias data discussed here is the
following: what participants are in fact doing in the experiments is not rea-
soning at all, at least not in the sense of drawing conclusions from premises.
Instead, they seem to be engaging in what could be described as belief man-
agement: what happens when new information comes in? Which beliefs do I
still hold on to? Reasoning experiments, and indeed deductive reasoning in
general, ask of participants to perform an “artiﬁcial” revision of their beliefs,
i.e., to accept the premises for the sake of the argument. We propose that a
thus far not sufﬁciently discussed aspect of these results is the extent to
which participants in fact do or do not perform a revision in the case of
unbelievable premises. Thus, the non-prioritized belief revision formal frame-
work as presented here suggests that the effect of beliefs in the participants’
performance, which is viewed as a “bias” under the assumption that partici-
pants should be performing deductive reasoning, is perhaps no bias at all if
what they are actually doing is engaging in belief management in view of
background knowledge.
Finally, it also bears emphasizing that, in the reasoning experiments discussed
above (and in fact, in most reasoning experiments), there is considerable individ-
ual variation in responses. For example, in the undergeneration example dis-
cussed above where the syllogistic conclusion to be drawn was “Some of the
actresses are not women”, a signiﬁcant group of 38% participants did draw this
highly counterintuitive but deductively correct conclusion. (We hypothesize that
these different responses are related to participants performing or not performing
the revision required by the false premise. Whether an individual does or does
not perform the revision will depend on her credibility ordering.) Indeed, any
plausible account of human reason must also make room for the phenomenon of
inter-personal variation.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we began by investigating how well the framework of preferential
logic fared when compared to some very robust experimental data on human rea-
soning, in particular data pertaining to the phenomena described under the head-
ing of conﬁrmation/belief bias. The initial motivation was the observation that the
concept of preferred models, which is the conceptual cornerstone of preferential
logic, seems to capture an important feature of human cognition, namely that
(contrary to the precepts of deductive reasoning) we only take into account situa-
tions that are minimally plausible (from the point of view of our prior beliefs and
background knowledge) for the purposes of reasoning. We showed that preferen-
tial logic makes accurate predictions related to how human reasoners “jump to
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conclusions” on the basis of limited available information, thus tentatively draw-
ing conclusions that are not deductively warranted by the available information
(overgeneration).
However, preferential logic was also found to make the wrong predictions
with respect to the phenomenon of undergeneration, i.e., the fact that reason-
ers may refuse to draw deductively warranted conclusions if they clash with
their prior beliefs. We suggested that undergeneration requires that attention
be paid to what happens when new information arrives and the agent must
decide (consciously or not) whether (or not) to perform a revision in her
belief state with the incoming information. This aspect in turn is treated
more successfully by the screened belief revision framework. The empirical
adequacy of screened belief revision with respect to the belief bias experi-
mental data suggests that what participants are engaging in in the experi-
ments is something that could be described as belief management, rather
than the act of drawing conclusions from premises. Interestingly, in cases
where there are no beliefs to speak of related to premises and conclusion
(say, in the wampet/hudon example), then belief management is not (cannot
be!) what participants engage in, and presumably they may then engage in
something closer to deductive reasoning (recall that the wampet/hudon case
elicited 78% of correct responses).
We thus conclude that preferential logic does not pass the test of empirical
adequacy posed by the belief bias data; in fact, any supraclassical logic will
run into the same difﬁculties when confronted with undergeneration. In con-
trast, screened belief revision predicts a fair amount of both undergeneration
and overgeneration. In both frameworks, prior belief and background knowl-
edge play a crucial role, but in different ways: in preferential logic, an agent’s
existing belief set will determine her preference ordering for models, whereas
in screened belief revision it becomes activated at the initial, screening stage.
Screened revision makes use of core beliefs, which must be preserved (though
in relationally screened revision there is not necessarily a set of core beliefs
which will not change, no matter what), whereas in standard preferential rea-
soning, background knowledge can be more easily revised.
Moreover, the present investigation can be seen as a case study for the fruitful-
ness but also the limitations of studying empirical phenomena pertaining to
human cognition from the point of view of formal frameworks. Formal frame-
works can lead to the formulation of hypotheses and experiments, and to the (par-
tial) explanation of the results. However, it may also happen that properties of the
formal framework in question, such as supraclassicality and the reﬂexive conse-
quence relation in preferential logic, do not reﬂect adequately the relevant empiri-
cal phenomena, as we have argued here.
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